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Population monitoring through data collection has increased and become part of the
everyday life in Western liberal states since the 1980s and 1990s. Whether we make
a phone call, a bank transfer, log in to work, or visit the hospital, a variety of state
and non-state actors gather and process our information to enable and constrain
access to various goods. In what has been convincingly described as a ‘surveillance
society’, migrants, especially non-EU citizens, are under particularly close scrutiny in
Europe. In this light, the most recent reform that again expanded mandate of Frontex
in the area of data analysis and exchange is perhaps not surprising. However, for the
agency to carry out these new tasks of monitoring migratory flows and performing
risk analyses, Frontex requires extensive, reliable data supply. This, in turn, revives
the question of the role of databases in the monitoring of migration.
Databases as a key population control device
Databases enable the storage, search, and retrieval of information. Advanced
electronic databases are believed to be highly effective, both by critics and
proponents, in facilitating population control on a large scale, enabling institutions to
identify and constitute individuals, especially those attempting to evade the state’s
eye such as undocumented migrants. Indeed, during the 1990s and 2000s, the
European Union established three major databases (namely Eurodac, SIS II, and
VIS) that should provide information on all asylum and visa applications filed, as
well as irregular entrants and residents apprehended, in Member States. Frontex
has now access to this large pool of data as its revised mandate allows Frontex
members to run searches across all three EU-wide databases.
And yet the effectiveness of monitoring techniques such as databases is far from
evident. Data protectionists warn of unchecked power and the potentially insatiable
greed for data that puts migrants (and their sponsors and spouses) under general
suspicion. On the one hand, critical voices from migration and surveillance studies
fear that electronic databases represent a ‘superpanopticon’ maximizing state
control. On the other hand, anthropologists and historians have pointed out that
state monitoring schemes largely failed. How effective is database surveillance by
governments? We know little about the implementation of the database approach
and about national legacies of state monitoring preceding Eurodac, SIS II, and VIS.
In this polarised debate between critics from various sides it is worth taking a step
back and looking at the emergence of data collection practices of migrants in
Europe. This blogpost contextualises Frontex by discussing a pioneer database in
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Europe, the German Central Foreigner Register that presumably served as a model
when establishing the European databases, and by drawing some lessons from
the German case for the European context regarding the effectiveness of database
surveillance.
The lure of surveillance through database: build-
up and design of the German Central Foreigner
Register
The Central Foreigner Register (Ausländerzentralregister, AZR) is a comprehensive
database established in 1953 and operated by the German federal interior
administration (Bundesverwaltungsamt) in Cologne. It stores detailed personal
information of all migrants who apply for a visa or a residence or work permit in
Germany, including any previous application results, warnings issued, or search
warrants. This central reference index is consulted prior to any permit being granted,
extended, or rejected. The volume, usage, and accessibility of the AZR were only
comprehensively regulated in 1994—that is after it had existed for almost four
decades. Today, it contains approximately 26 million records, accessible to over
14.000 authorities and agencies. Therefore, the AZR is considered by the German
authorities as the ‘central pillar’ of Germany’s migration control system.
Germany pioneered the database approach to migration control in post-1945
Europe. Following the end of the Second World War, Germany was a hub of people
on the move. While migration through post-war Germany was highly regulated
with a multiple permit system, the implementation of this system was decentral
and discretionary. The Allied Forces were concerned about the inconsistent
implementation of the registration system by local Foreigners Authorities and
requested a central register to be set up in order to standardise the issuing of entry,
work, and residence permits. Due to international pressure, the build-up of the
Central Foreigner Register (Ausländerzentralregister, AZR) began in 1953 in West
Germany.
The AZR was designed to provide a constant, reliable overview of all migrants
entering, residing in, or leaving the Republic. As previously mentioned, the
AZR should be consulted by local Foreigners Authorities prior to any permit
being granted, extended, or rejected. The centralised database also had a
blacklist function allowing differentiated searches for undesired migrants, such
as Communists in the global context of the Cold War. Finally, the database was
believed to be the only reliable means of obtaining a comprehensive statistical
overview of migrants in Germany. In 1967, the operation of the AZR was
computerised and changed over from a paper-based index card system to electronic
data processing with the aim to speed up the register activity and make it more
efficient. However, the archival records in the Federal Archive Koblenz suggest a
series of unintended and counterproductive effects.
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Migrant monitoring in the 1970s and today: the
striking similarity of pitfalls and malfunctions
The AZR struggled to provide the perfect gaze on migrants it was intended to deliver
for three reasons. First, the creation of the AZR suffered from a lack of political
willingness and from diverging interests. As an early example of a hybrid database,
the AZR combined the international expectation of migration monitoring juxtaposed
with existing state and local foreigner registers originating in 19th century police
states. The request in 1953 that all Länder should submit their registers (or a copy
thereof) to the German Federal Interior Ministry provoked a power struggle between
the Federal Interior Ministry and the Länder Interior Ministries. Not every Land was
willing to hand over their index cards, some considered this a loss of competences
and significantly delayed their submission. Likewise in the EU today, there are
diverging interests and power struggles impeding the effectiveness of EU databases.
Consider for example, that EU Member States at the southern Schengen border
may have little interest to take fingerprints of asylum seekers as long as the Dublin
Regulation requires asylum applications to be made in the Member State of first
arrival without there being a system of redistributing the share of asylum seekers
across the EU.
Second, the establishment of the AZR was complicated by limited state capacity.
The maintenance of the initially paper-based index card system represented a major
challenge even in a highly bureaucratized state such as Germany. The early years
of the AZR were characterised by a repeated shortage of storage space, index
cards, and staff to manually attend and search the register. The change to electronic
data processing did not speed up the AZR but produced new problems of data
supply. For example, during the 1970s the local Foreigners Authorities of Munich
completely stopped sending update cards to the AZR as they were preoccupied with
the computerisation of their own records. Officials were highly concerned that this
compromised the reliability of the AZR, especially since Munich was considered the
main gateway to Germany from the South, leaving the register out-of-date and prone
to providing false information. In 2015, Munich was again a central gateway for
refugees arriving on the Balkan route and the German authorities were completely
overwhelmed and incapable to register all new arrivals. Despite comprehensive
computerisation and international connectivity of the European databases, data
supply and data reliability continue to be the weak points of the system nowadays.
Third, a major pitfall of the AZR was that it effectively produced the fallacy of the
perfect gaze and nurtured the aspiration of comprehensive surveillance. When the
database was still in the establishment process, it already received a large volume
of unexpected data requests by a variety of state and non-state actors. This included
international state governments who sought information on emigrants suspected
to be ‘Communists’, private companies looking for details on runaway migrant
employees, as well as religious associations planning pastoral care for migrant
faith communities. These additional information requests occupied the register
staff and slowed down other essential activities such as answering the steadily
growing backlog of requests by local Foreigners Authorities to clear individual permit
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applications. The fallacy of the perfect gaze still prevails today, when politicians
call for hightened registration following terrorist attacks or when the European
Commission advocates for ‘stronger and smater information systems’ to ensure a
high level or internal security. But knowing who is in the country does not prevent
criminal acts; a tighter registration system neither provides water-tight surveillance
nor can it guarantee security.
Current EU developments: towards a ‘smart’ and
‘interoperable’ network of databases?
Arguably fuelled by the aspiration of the perfect gaze on migrants, Germany has
pushed for the introduction and expansion of the database approach at the EU
level since the 1990s. The three major EU databases (Eurodac, SIS, and VIS)
are now located in a bullet-proof building in Strasbourg and managed by a special
agency called eu-LISA (European Agency for the operational management of
large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice). A ‘European
Search Portal’ (ESP) is currently being set up to make these separate databases
‘interoperable’, that is, allowing enhanced search functions across all three of them
to a range of actors, including Frontex. The ESP also has a ‘smart’ sorting function:
It is designed to facilitate the free movement of EU citizens and frequent travellers
across Europe while identifying those considered a security threat.
Today, technology is more advanced than in the 1950s and 60s, facilitating ever
bigger and faster databases. For example, compared to the AZR’s approximately
26 million records, VIS alone stored almost 65 million visa applications, some 64
million facial images, and roughly 57 million fingerprint sets at the end of 2018. The
establishment of databases at the EU level certainly enhanced migration monitoring
insofar as it centralized information and made it easier to access and use on a larger
scale in terms of data volume and users, including supranational actors such as
Frontex.
However, it would be misleading to think that databases allow an impeccable
overview of migrants. Technology may be more advanced today but the
effectiveness of databases still depends on the same basic issues as in the 1950s
to 70s: state capacity and political interests. Reportedly, the AZR count of the overall
migrant population resident in Germany is still inaccurate as the register contains
duplicate and out-of-date files. Moreover, data supply requires the cooperation of
data suppliers whose interests often diverge.
Concluding reflections on the symbolic character of
databases for migration management
In light of the problems highlighted here, the primary function of migration databases
seems to be a symbolic one, that is (re)producing the image, belief, and authority of
the modern state as capable of exercising migration control, both to an internal and
external audience. From a political sociological perspective, the database is highly
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effective in producing a specific self-understanding of the State as a rationalized,
sovereign power. The archival records show that public officials were highly anxious
that the AZR should be working. In this sense, the database performs a ‘ritual of
verification’as found in accounting and auditing practices. The AZR rarely functioned
according to the official blueprint but it provided a ‘framing’ and a certain ‘style’ of
migration control from which (West) Germany emerged as a legitimate efficient state
power among the international league of Western capitalist states in the post-war
era.
From a current global perspective, the popularity of the database approach is
not ceasing but expanding, see for example China’s social credit system. Would
database monitoring be more effective if it was based on algorythms and artificial
intelligence, as practiced with ‘predictive policing software’ in the United States,
United Kingdom, South Africa, Brazil, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands?
This would require further research. This blogpost suggests that contemporary
surveillance, security, and migration scholars and policymakers could learn a lesson
from the past. The German case shows that the database approach to migration
control nurtures external expectations and self-expectations that the state should
be able to monitor migrants. However, it remains highly questionable whether the
state’s ambition to grasp increasingly mobile populations can ever be achieved
through state registers and databases as long as there is human (and technological)
agency.
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